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Abstract
To what extent do car buyers undervalue future fuel costs, and what does this imply
for the e¤ectiveness and welfare impact of alternative tax policies? To address both
questions, we show it is crucial to account for consumer heterogeneity in mileage and
other dimensions. We use detailed product-level data for a long panel of European
countries, and exploit variation in fuel costs by engine type. Although we nd there is
modest undervaluation of fuel costs, fuel taxes are still more e¤ective in reducing fuel
usage than product taxes based on fuel economy. They also perform much better in
terms of total welfare even if usage demand is inelastic. The reason is that fuel taxes
better target the right consumers, those with a high mileage, to purchase more fuel
e¢ cient cars.
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1 Introduction
Governments are using a variety of policies to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars.
A central question in this debate is whether it is preferable to focus on fuel taxes or on
policies that encourage the sales of fuel e¢ cient cars, such as standards or product taxes
based on the carsfuel economy. Fuel taxes are often favored because they directly inuence
the car usage decision and hence the amount of CO2 emissions. Furthermore, they may also
indirectly inuence the car purchase decision if consumers take into account their expected
future fuel costs. However, if driving behavior is rather inelastic and if consumers are myopic
and ignore future fuel cost savings when purchasing a car, then it may be more e¤ective to
directly inuence the car purchase decision through standards or through up-front product
taxes on cars with low fuel economy (possibly combined with product subsidies on cars
with high fuel economy). In sum, fuel taxes may be more e¤ective because they reduce car
usage when driving behavior is not perfectly inelastic, while product taxes may be more
e¤ective because they can stimulate consumers to buy more fuel e¢ cient cars if there is an
investment ine¢ ciency because of consumer myopia (see Allcott and Greenstone (2012) for
a recent detailed review).
In this paper we contribute to this debate by properly accounting for consumer hetero-
geneity, which implies an important advantage of fuel taxes over product taxes that has
not been considered before. Fuel taxes better target the right consumers, those with a high
mileage, to purchase the most fuel e¢ cient cars. This targeting e¤ect makes fuel taxes more
e¤ective in reducing total fuel usage than product taxes, even when consumers are moder-
ately short sighted and mileage is perfectly inelastic. We establish this result in two steps.
We rst ask whether consumers undervalue or correctly value the discounted future fuel
costs when purchasing a new car. After estimating the degree of consumer myopia, we then
compare the e¤ectiveness of a fuel and product tax in reducing total fuel usage and CO2
emissions, where the taxes are held revenue equivalent. We also compare the welfare e¤ects
of both taxes in correcting for the externality costs of driving. In both steps it is crucial to
account for consumer heterogeneity. In the rst step accounting for consumer heterogeneity
avoids possibly biased parameter estimates of consumersvaluation of future fuel costs. In
the second step mileage heterogeneity implies that heavy users (and hence heavy polluters)
will be more responsive to fuel taxes than product taxes, with implications for both the
e¤ectiveness and welfare e¤ects of the taxes.
To address these questions, we build on the aggregate random coe¢ cients logit demand
model of Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), and introduce a specication that accounts for
heterogeneous responses to fuel costs because consumers may di¤er in their annual mileage.
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We conservatively assume that driving behavior (mileage) is perfectly inelastic with respect
to the fuel price. We show that the relative e¤ectiveness of fuel taxes versus product taxes
in reducing total fuel usage depends on two key parameters: consumersvaluation of future
fuel costs and mileage heterogeneity.
To estimate the demand model, we use detailed data at the level of the car model and
engine variant for a panel of seven European countries during 1998-2011. The institutional
features of the European car market provide a new way to help identifying consumer re-
sponses to fuel costs, because for most car models consumers can choose between two engine
types: gasoline and diesel. Diesel cars are typically more expensive (by on average about
30%), but they also involve much lower fuel costs because of a higher fuel economy (by about
20%) and a lower diesel fuel price (by about 20 cents per liter, depending on the specic
countrys fuel tax policy). The consumersintertemporal choice problem is correspondingly
simpler in Europe than in the U.S., since consumers can trade o¤ the higher initial purchase
price of a diesel engine against the future fuel cost savings of an otherwise nearly identical
car. To empirically identify consumer responses to fuel costs, we include car model xed
e¤ects, thereby exploiting fuel cost variation between engines of the same car model. Chugh,
Cropper, and Narain (2011) and Verboven (2002) also exploit fuel cost variation between
gasoline and diesel cars: the former in a hedonic price study of Indian twin car models, the
latter in a demand study that focuses on substitution within both fuel types but abstracts
from substitution across products. Our approach complements other recent identication
approaches, mainly for the U.S. market, where diesel cars are practically absent: these stud-
ies typically can rely on rich time-series variation in the price of gasoline, interacted with
fuel economy variation across products (e.g. Klier and Linn (2010), Li, Timmins, and von
Haefen (2009), Allcott and Wozny (2014), Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2013), Langer
and Miller (2013), Sallee, West, and Fan (2016)). We document that time series variation is
not important in our setting to identify consumer responses to fuel economy.1
Regarding the valuation of future fuel costs, we nd evidence of only modest undervalua-
tion: for one euro saving in discounted future fuel costs, consumers are willing to pay e0.91
in the form of a higher initial purchase price, and the hypothesis of correct valuation cannot
be rejected. The estimates are slightly lower if we do not account for consumer heterogeneity,
and the results remain robust in a variety of other specications.
Regarding the e¤ectiveness of fuel taxes versus product taxes, we nd that it is crucial
to account for mileage heterogeneity. Without accounting for mileage heterogeneity, a fuel
tax would be slightly less e¤ective than a product tax in reducing total fuel usage, because
1The time-series variation in gasoline prices tends to be larger in the U.S. than in Europe, and the car
sales and price information is often observed at a higher frequency (monthly instead of annually).
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of the modest undervaluation of future fuel costs. However, once we account for mileage
heterogeneity, a fuel tax turns out to be more e¤ective because it specically targets the
high mileage consumers to substitute to cars with a higher fuel economy. Note that these
conclusions depend on our nding that there is only limited undervaluation of future fuel
costs. If there would be stronger consumer myopia, our conclusion would be reversed: a
product tax would then be more e¤ective in reducing total fuel usage (despite the mileage
heterogeneity).2
To further explore the e¤ectiveness of fuel taxes under mileage heterogeneity, we also
consider the impact of separately raising the price of diesel fuel or gasoline fuel (rather than
simultaneously raising both). This is of broader interest, since countries are increasingly
using fuel-specic tax policies to encourage the adoption of cars with alternative fuels (such
as methanol). We nd that the role of mileage heterogeneity becomes even more impor-
tant under such fuel-specic tax policies. For example, raising the diesel fuel price without
changing the gasoline fuel price implies a drop in diesel market share by 12.3%, but a dis-
proportionately larger drop in diesel fuel usage by 37.8%.3 We also nd that the lower fuel
costs for diesel cars explain about half of the diesel market share in Europe, though less so
in the most recent years.
Finally, we consider the welfare implications of our analysis. We compare the impact
of a fuel and product tax on the various welfare components: decision consumer surplus,
consumer losses from misoptimization (internality), externality costs and tax revenues. We
nd that a fuel tax performs much better than a product tax, even when usage demand
itself is perfectly inelastic. Fuel taxes require a lower total tax amount to achieve the same
externality reduction because they directly target the high mileage consumers. In contrast,
product taxes a¤ect all consumers in the same way, which results in lower welfare gains
despite the modest undervaluation of future fuel costs. This again stresses the importance
of accounting for mileage heterogeneity in car taxation policy.
Our paper relates to several strands in the literature. First, our nding of at most
only modest undervaluation of future fuel costs contributes to a long empirical debate since
Hausman (1979). He estimated consumersimplicit interest rates in their intertemporal trade-
o¤ between paying a higher initial purchase price for air conditioners in exchange for future
energy cost savings. Most work on the automobile market appears to nd mixed evidence
2These conclusions are obtained under the assumption that driving behavior is perfectly inelastic. If we
would allow driving behavior to depend on fuel prices, our results would be strengthened in favour of fuel
taxes, since fuel taxes would also induce consumers to reduce their car usage.
3Miravete, Moral, and Thurk (2014) study how the favorable treatment of diesel cars may have have
protected the domestic European producers against foreign competition in the Spanish market. They do not
explicitly model mileage heterogeneity, and our analysis implies that this implies even greater environmental
costs.
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for the degree of undervaluation of future fuel costs; see Greene (2010) and Helfand and
Wolverton (2011) for recent reviews. Allcott and Wozny (2014) nd evidence of moderate
undervaluation, while Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2013), Sallee, West, and Fan (2016),
Chugh, Cropper, and Narain (2011) and Verboven (2002) nd more or less correct valuation
of future fuel costs relative to the initial purchase price of a car. Bento, Li, and Roth (2012)
show through simulations that a failure to account for consumer heterogeneity in willingness
to pay for fuel costs may be responsible for a sorting bias towards nding undervaluation, but
they do not provide an empirical analysis to quantify its importance. Our paper incorporates
mileage heterogeneity to avoid this bias, and at the same time it also incorporates other
sources of consumer heterogeneity to avoid a reverse sorting bias. To our knowledge, no
other work has systematically incorporated this to investigate whether consumers undervalue
future fuel costs.4
Second, we contribute to the literature on the relative e¤ectiveness of energy taxes versus
product taxes and standards to reduce total energy usage and CO2 emissions and improve
total welfare. Allcott andWozny (2014) provide a detailed review on the relative e¤ectiveness
of both policy instruments. On the one hand, energy taxes directly a¤ect usage, so they can
be e¤ective in reducing energy consumption if usage is su¢ ciently elastic. On the other hand,
a product tax on the energy-ine¢ cient product (or a subsidy on the energy-e¢ cient product in
their discussion) can better encourage the demand for energy-e¢ cient products if consumers
undervalue future energy cost savings, thereby reducing an investment ine¢ ciency.5 Our
contribution to this debate is to show that even if usage demand is inelastic, an energy tax
can be more e¤ective than a product tax. The reason is that if consumers are heterogeneous
in their annual mileage, an energy tax better targets the high mileage consumers than a
product tax.6
In a related theoretical paper, Allcott, Mullainathan, and Taubinsky (2014) compare the
combined welfare e¤ects of an energy tax and a product tax. They also stress the role of
4Verboven (2002) incorporates mileage heterogeneity to explain the consumersdecision to buy a gasoline
or diesel car and obtains estimates on their implicit interest rates when trading o¤ the higher purchase
price of a diesel engine against the future fuel cost savings. However, he focuses only on the decision to
buy a gasoline or diesel engine, conditional on purchasing a certain car model. Although this avoids biases
in estimating implicit interest rates, the framework does not allow to assess how taxes shift consumers to
purchase other cars in policy counterfactuals.
5Jacobsen (2013) and Jacobsen and van Benthem (2015) show that product taxes may also distort the
used car market and householdsscrappage decision. Our data is limited to new vehicle sales so we abstract
from these e¤ects in our analysis.
6Our nding that an energy tax can be more e¤ective than a product tax does not mean that a product
tax cannot be e¤ective in itself. In an interesting recent paper, Klier and Linn (2015) use data from three
EU countries and nd that product taxes can considerably shift sales towards cars with lower emissions. Our
own results conrm this, but in addition we show that energy taxes are even more e¤ective because they
better target consumers with di¤erent mileage.
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consumer heterogeneity, but they focus on heterogeneity in the extent of undervaluation (or
attentiveness). In our welfare analysis we focus on the role of mileage heterogeneity, a
natural starting point since this distribution is directly observed. Nevertheless, in future
work it would be interesting to extend the welfare evaluation to allow for both heterogeneity
in attentiveness, mileage and product quality. Our welfare analysis is also complementary to
recent work by Jacobsen, Knittel, Sallee, and van Benthem (2016). They develop a su¢ cient
statistic to measure the importance of heterogeneity in externalities when designing taxes.
Our structural framework explicitly focuses on the role of mileage heterogeneity and how this
impacts the performance of fuel versus product taxes, while allowing for mean undervaluation
of consumers.
Third, there is a large literature on estimating demand systems for automobiles. Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), Petrin (2002) and others have shown how to make use of ag-
gregate sales data to estimate rich substitution patterns between di¤erentiated cars. While
this work has often included a random taste coe¢ cient for miles per dollar, we show how
to relate this random coe¢ cient more explicitly to consumer mileage heterogeneity. This
makes it possible to use the aggregate demand model to address environmental questions
such as the e¤ects of tax policies on total fuel usage, whereas previous applications with
aggregate data could only assess a more limited set of e¤ects.7 There is already an impor-
tant empirical literature that uses micro-level data to thoroughly investigate the e¤ects of
environmental policies on both car purchase and car usage decisions (e.g. Goldberg (1998),
Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen (2009), Gillingham (2012), and DHaultfoeuille,
Givord, and Boutin (2014)). However, applications with micro-data are typically limited
to a single country and a short time period. Our aggregate demand model with mileage
heterogeneity thus considerably broadens the scope of applications, since aggregate data can
be analyzed for a large set of countries and a longer time period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the demand model,
incorporating the consumers intertemporal trade-o¤ between the initial purchase price of
the car and future fuel costs, and highlighting the key parameters that drive consumer
responses to fuel taxes versus product taxes: a future valuation parameter and mileage
heterogeneity. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 provides details on the empirical
estimation strategy and the identication issues. Section 5 presents and discusses the demand
7For example, Adamou, Clerides, and Zachariadis (2014) estimate an aggregate demand system to assess
the e¤ects of feebates in Germany (combination of car subsidy for fuel e¢ cient cars with tax for fuel ine¢ cient
cars). They can look at the e¤ects on demand and consumer surplus, but not at the e¤ects on fuel usage since
they do not explicitly model consumer mileage. Huse and Lucinda (2014) consider the e¤ects of a Swedish
subsidy program to cars with su¢ ciently low CO2 emissions (where cars are more likely to be eligible if
they run on alternative fuels). They assess the e¤ects on demand and emissions, but without accounting for
mileage heterogeneity in the demand model.
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parameter estimates and implications for consumersvaluation of future fuel costs. Section
6 presents policy counterfactuals, in particular a comparison between fuel tax and product
taxes based on fuel-economy. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
When consumers decide to purchase a new car, they face the intertemporal trade-o¤between
the initial purchase price of the car and the expected future fuel costs. Forward-looking
consumers have a high willingness to pay for fuel e¢ cient cars that save on fuel costs,
whereas myopic consumers have a low willingness to pay for such cars. In subsection 2.1
we model this intertemporal choice problem. We model the consumersdiscounted expected
future fuel costs in the aggregate random coe¢ cients logit demand model of Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995). Our model accounts for heterogeneous responses because consumers may
di¤er in their annual mileage and hence in their expected future fuel costs. In subsection
2.2 we use this demand model to discuss the di¤erent impact of two alternative taxes: a fuel
tax and a product tax on the carsfuel economy. This will serve as the basis to motivate our
demand specication and subsequent policy counterfactuals.
2.1 Demand
There are T markets, dened as country/year combinations, with It potential consumers in
each market t. Consumers are assumed to purchase a car only in the market where they are
located. To simplify notation, we suppress the market subscript t in this section.
We dene a car as a combination of a baseline model j and engine variant k. Consumer i
may either choose a car model j with engine variant k, or decide not to buy a car and consume
the outside good 0. The decision to buy a car a¤ects the intertemporal budget constraint
in two ways. First, consumers pay a capital cost, the initial purchase price pjk. Second, they
pay the present discounted value of expected future fuel costs Gijk. The conditional indirect
utility of consumer i for car model j and engine variant k is
uijk = xjk
x
i   i(pjk + Gijk) + jk + "ijk; (1)
where xjk is a vector of observed car and engine characteristics and jk is an unobserved
product characteristic. The vector xi captures individual-specic valuations for the product
characteristics, i is the marginal utility of income, and "ijk is a remaining individual-specic
valuation for car jk, modeled as an extreme value (logit) random variable. The utility of the
outside good is normalized to ui00 = "i00. The parameter  is Allcott and Wozny (2014)s
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attention weightor future valuationparameter. If  = 1, consumers correctly trade o¤
the cars purchase price pjk against the present discounted value of future fuel costs Gijk.
If  < 1 consumers undervalue future payo¤s, and if  > 1 consumers overvalue the future
payo¤s.
Our main focus in (1) is on the specication of Gijk, i.e. consumer is present discounted
value of expected future fuel costs for model j with engine k. We allow fuel costs Gijk to be
consumer-specic because of heterogeneity in annual mileage. Furthermore, Gijk depends on
expected fuel prices, on the relevant time horizon and the interest rate. More precisely, we
dene the present value of expected fuel costs over the cars lifetime as follows:
Gijk = E
"
SX
s=1
(1 + r) s mi ejkgks
#
; (2)
where (i) mi is consumer is expected annual mileage, measured in km; (ii) ejk is the fuel
consumption of car j with engine k, measured in liter per km (or gallons per milein the
US), i.e. the inverse of a cars fuel economy; (iii) gks is the fuel price of engine type k (either
gasoline or diesel fuel) at time s, measured in e per liter; (iv) r is the interest rate at which
consumers discount future fuel costs and S is the time horizon over which consumers value
fuel cost savings, which may be related to the cars expected lifetime.8 We model annual
mileage and expected future fuel costs in a way that makes the expression for Gijk simple
and identication transparent.
First, we allow annual mileage mi to be heterogeneous across consumers using the em-
pirical distribution of mileage. This addresses a possible sorting bias in aggregate demand
models that would arise if high mileage consumers choose to buy more fuel e¢ cient cars (as
discussed in Bento, Li and Roth, 2012). It also enables us to assess how consumers with
di¤erent mileage respond to alternative tax policies.9 Our specication assumes that annual
mileage mi is perfectly inelastic, i.e. independent of the fuel price. Empirical evidence shows
that the driving behavior is indeed relatively inelastic; see e.g. Goldberg (1998), Hughes,
Knittel, and Sperling (2008), Bento, Goulder, Jacobsen, and von Haefen (2009), and Gilling-
ham (2012). If we would allow driving behavior to depend on fuel prices, our result that a
fuel tax is more e¤ective than a product tax would be strengthened.
8In practice, vehicle lifetime may not be xed but may partly depend on mileage and we account for this
possibility in a robustness analysis below.
9Other work has accounted for mileage heterogeneity by using micro-level data, see e.g. Bento et al. (2009)
and Gillingham (2012) for the U.S. market. Allcott and Wozny (2014) account for mileage heterogeneity in
an aggregate nested logit model by measuring average annual mileage per car model. Their approach does
not however allow for policy counterfactuals, since it does not account for the possibility that consumers
with di¤erent mileages substitute to other cars in response to tax policies.
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Second, we assume that fuel prices for each engine type k, gks, follow a random walk,
so the consumersexpected fuel price at time s is equal to the current fuel price (at time
s = 0): E [gks] = gk. This assumption is consistent with recent ndings of Anderson, Kellogg
and Sallee (2013). Some studies have instead considered alternative models for expectations
about future fuel prices (based on actual future prices or past prices). In a literature review,
Alquist, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011) conclude that these alternative models do not appear to
outperformmodels with expectations that are only based on current prices. In our robustness
analysis we will use futures prices as a proxy for consumersprice forecasts of fuel prices,
which gives similar results.
Under these assumptions, we can rewrite the present value of expected future fuel costs
for consumer i buying car j with engine k as
Gijk = 
m
i ejkgk; (3)
i.e. consumer is annual mileage mi (in km) times the cars fuel consumption ejk (in liter/km)
times the current fuel price gk (in e/liter)km times a capitalization coe¢ cient :
 
SX
s=1
(1 + r) s =
1
r
h
1  (1 + r) S
i
; (4)
which converts the annual fuel cost mi ejkgk into a net present value. Intuitively, the capi-
talization coe¢ cient  measures the extent to which consumers trade o¤ the initial purchase
price of a car against annual fuel costs, and lies in the interval [0; S]. If consumers are fully
myopic (r ! 1), then  = 0: consumers then give no weight to current annual fuel costs.
In contrast, if consumers do not discount the future (r ! 0), then  = S. Consumers then
weigh the current annual fuel costs by a factor S relative to the purchase price of the car:
they count on a pay-back timeS when investing in a car with a higher fuel economy.
We can substitute (3) into (1) to write consumer is conditional indirect utility for car
model j and engine variant k as
uijk = xjk
x
i   i(pjk + mi ejkgk) + jk + "ijk: (5)
This is close to a standard random coe¢ cients utility specication, where i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i )
are the random coe¢ cients for which means and (co)variances may be estimated. The
future valuation parameter  and the capitalization coe¢ cient  are additional parameters,
but they are not separately identied from the scale of mi . We will therefore make use of
prior information on the empirical distribution of mileage mi in our empirical analysis, so
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that  becomes identied from the scale of mi .
One can then use (4) to interpret the estimate of  in three di¤erent ways. First, as
in Hausman (1979), one can retrieve the consumersimplicit interest rate r at which they
discount the future, for a given value of the cars expected lifetime S and setting  = 1.
Second, one can retrieve the consumersrequired pay-back time S, setting r = 0 and  = 1.
Third, as in Allcott and Wozny (2014), one can impose both a market interest rate r and
an expected lifetime S to retrieve the attention weight parameter , measuring the extent
to which consumers undervalue ( < 1) or overvalue the future ( > 1). We will focus on
the third approach.
We complete the demand model by assuming that each consumer i chooses the model
j with engine k that maximizes her utility out of all possible alternatives in the choice
set (including the outside option). Furthermore, assume that the random coe¢ cients i =
(xi ; i; 
m
i ) come from a distribution F(; ), where  are means and (co)variance para-
meters to be estimated; assume also that i is independent of the individual- and product-
specic taste valuations "ijk, which come from the type I extreme value distribution. Under
these assumptions, the predicted market share for model j with engine k is the probability
that jk gives the highest utility:
sjk (; ; ) =
Z

exp(xjk
x   (pjk + mejkgk) + jk)
1 +
PJ
j0
PKj0
k0=1 exp(xj0k0
x   (pj0k0 + mej0k0gk0) + j0k0)
dF(; ): (6)
Observed sales can then be equated to the predicted market share times the number of
potential consumers I, i.e. qjk = sjk (; ; ) I. Following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
and subsequent work, the market shares can be approximated by Monte Carlo simulation
with R draws of i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i ) from the distribution F(; ).
2.2 Consumer responses to taxes
We will estimate the demand model to compare the e¤ectiveness (in reducing total fuel us-
age) and the total welfare impact of two alternative taxes: a fuel tax and a product tax on
the carsfuel consumption. We will do this comparison in detail in our policy counterfac-
tuals after having estimated the demand model. In this section, we give an overview of the
possible e¤ects of both taxes on the composition of new car sales. This provides economic
intuition, and will highlight the specic features that need careful attention in our empirical
specication.
A fuel tax tGk is a tax on gasoline and/or diesel fuel gk, whereas the product tax t
E
k is a tax
on a cars fuel consumption ejk. The product tax on a cars fuel consumption ejk is equivalent
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to the commonly used product tax on a cars CO2 emissions, since there is a proportional
relationship between both. The two taxes a¤ect a consumers conditional indirect utility (5)
as follows:
uijk = xjk
x
i   i
 
pjk + t
E
k ejk
  imi ejk  gk + tGk + jk + "ijk:
Previous work has stressed the relative advantages of both taxes. On the one hand, a
fuel tax is preferable because it directly reduces usage and hence (pollution) externalities, as
long as driving behavior is not perfectly inelastic. On the other hand, a product tax on the
carsfuel consumption can be preferable if consumers undervalue their future fuel costs when
purchasing a durable good. Put di¤erently, a fuel tax mainly serves to correct for externalities
by a¤ecting the driving decision, while a product tax on fuel consumption mainly corrects
for an investment ine¢ ciency from consumer myopia. Allcott and Greenstone (2012) provide
interesting further discussion of both e¤ects (where they focus on a subsidy for the energy
e¢ cient product, instead of a tax on the energy ine¢ cient product).
In our analysis we assume that utilization is perfectly inelastic, so we rule out the pos-
sibility that a fuel tax corrects for an externality by reducing utilization. We instead focus
on another role of fuel taxes: in the presence of consumer mileage heterogeneity, a fuel tax
especially targets the high mileage consumers. Hence, a fuel tax may be more e¤ective in
reducing total fuel usage than a product tax, even if it does not directly a¤ect utilization
decisions.
To more precisely see the role of mileage heterogeneity and consumer myopia in the
impact of a fuel tax versus a product tax, it is useful to consider the case where the taxes
do not depend on the fuel type k, i.e. tGk = t
G and tEk = t
E for both gasoline and diesel cars.
Using qjk = sjk (; ; ) I and the expression (6) for sjk (; ; ), Appendix A shows that a
small increase of tG and tE has the following e¤ect on the demand for product jk:
@qjk
@tG
=  
Z

i
m
i sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I
@qjk
@tE
=  
Z

isijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I
where ei =
P
j
P
k ejksijk= (1  si0) is the expected fuel consumption over cars purchased by
consumer i. We can make the following two observations.
First, the e¤ect of both taxes depends on the sign of the term ejk   ei + si0ei. If all
cars would have the same fuel consumption, i.e. ejk = e for all jk, then ejk   ei = 0. Both
taxes would then reduce the demand for all cars, proportional to the aggregate consumer
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responses to the outside good si0 and the price sensitivity parameter i. The e¤ect of both
taxes is then similar to the e¤ect of an industry-wide price increase. In contrast, if cars
di¤er in their fuel consumption, then the demand for some cars can increase despite the tax
increase. This will be the case for cars with a su¢ ciently low fuel consumption, i.e. ejk < ei,
and when there is limited substitution to the outside good (si0 small). In sum, both taxes
have in common that they shift the composition of new car sales from cars with a high fuel
consumption ejk to cars with a low fuel consumption.
Second, the e¤ect of both taxes di¤ers because of two factors: the future valuation
parameter () and the extent of mileage heterogeneity (mi ). In the absence of mileage
heterogeneity (mi = 
m for all i), it can be shown that a fuel tax tG has exactly the same
demand e¤ect as a revenue-equivalent product tax tE when  = 1, and a weaker impact when
 < 1 (the investment ine¢ ciency referred to above). When there is mileage heterogeneity,
the comparison between the demand impact of both taxes becomes more complicated.
To summarize this, the price sensitivity parameter i and the extent substitution to the
outside good si0 determine the general impact of both taxes, whereas the future valuation
parameter  and the extent of mileage heterogeneity mi explain the di¤erences in their
impact. In our empirical analysis we show how these parameters translate into di¤erences
in the e¤ectiveness (in reducing total fuel usage) and the total welfare impact of both taxes.
3 Data
Our main dataset is a rich panel of data from the European car market, obtained from a mar-
ket research rm (JATO). The dataset includes the sales, prices, and product characteristics
for every new passenger car sold during 1998-2011 in seven European countries: Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the UK. The data cover around 90%
of the sales in the European Union.
The unit of observation is at the very detailed level of the car variant jk, i.e. the
combination of a car model j equipped with engine k. The car model j is a brand/model/body
type combination, e.g. Volkswagen Golf hatchback, whereas the engine k consists of the
fuel engine type (gasoline or diesel), displacement and horsepower, e.g. gasoline, 1,390cc,
59kW. Our highly disaggregate denition of a car variant make it possible to capture
all possible variation in fuel e¢ ciency and engine performance. After excluding cars with
extremely low sales (e.g. Bentley Arnage), we retain on average about 800 car variants per
country/year, i.e. 180 models with on average 4.4 engines. This results in a panel dataset of
approximately 80,000 observations (car variants/countries/years).
Sales are dened as new vehicle registrations. Prices are suggested retail prices, including
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VAT and registration taxes which di¤er across markets and engines (separately obtained
from the European Automobile Manufacturers Association). According to European survey
data (reviewed in Goldberg and Verboven (2005)), discounts mainly vary by car model and
country, which we will account for with a rich set of car and country xed e¤ects.10 Car
characteristics include measures of vehicle size (curb weight, width, length and height),
engine performance (horsepower and displacement) and fuel consumption (liter/100km). In
addition, based on a brands perceived country of origin, we construct a dummy for whether
a model is of foreign or domestic origin in each country.11
We supplement this dataset with information on fuel prices, the empirical distribution
of annual miles travelled and other country/year-level information. Gasoline and diesel fuel
prices by year and country are from the Directorate General for Economic and Financial
A¤airs. Fuel prices mainly vary over time, rather than across countries. Figure 1 plots the
average annual price of gasoline and diesel fuel during 19982011 (in real year 2000 Euros) as
well as the di¤erence between the price of gasoline and diesel across countries. The top panel
shows that gasoline and diesel fuel prices are increasing to reach peaks in 2008 and 2011.
Diesel fuel is on average 16% less expensive than gasoline fuel, but the gap varies during the
period. According to the bottom panel, the price of gasoline is higher than that of diesel in
almost all countries. The gap between both fuel prices is the highest in the Netherlands and
Belgium. The gap often changes in the same direction across countries, but the magnitudes
of these changes may di¤er considerably.
The empirical distribution of annual miles travelled is from the 2007 UK National Travel
Survey, a rich nationally representative survey of 20,000 individuals.12 We plot the distrib-
ution in Figure 2. The distribution of mileage is skewed to the right: 20% of the population
drives less than 7,000 km/year, 50% drives less than 10,200 km/year, 80% drives less than
18,000 km/year, while 10% drives more than 25,000 km/year. According to this survey,
average annual mileage is 14,700 km/year. There is no such detailed information on the
empirical mileage distribution in other countries of our dataset. Eurostat reports average
annual mileages by country, using somewhat di¤ering methodologies. These averages are in
line with the most reliable average of the distribution reported in the UK National Travel
10For the U.S., Langer and Miller (2013) exploit detailed transaction data. They nd that discounts are
higher for cars with higher fuel costs (conditional on time and vehicle xed e¤ects), and point out that this
may imply a downward bias of the fuel cost coe¢ cient by 13.7% (or higher). If discounts also vary with fuel
costs in Europe, our fuel cost valuation parameter may also be biased downwards to some extent.
11For example, the Volkswagen Golf is perceived as domestic by German consumers even though part of
the production of Golf takes place in Spain.
12www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-transport/series/national-travel-survey-
statistics
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Survey13. We therefore assume that mileage in the other countries follows the same distribu-
tion as in the UK. Finally, we use information on GDP/capita in each country/year to scale
car prices and annual fuel costs in the same units across countries, and we use population
per country/year to construct the variable for the number of potential consumers.
Summary statistics Table 1 provides summary statistics (mean and standard deviation)
for the variables included in our empirical demand model. As one may expect, characteristics
that may vary across both models and engines (price, horsepower, annual fuel costs) show
a higher dispersion around the mean than characteristics that mainly vary across models
(size, height and the foreign dummy). Furthermore, several characteristics show considerable
changes over the sample period: horsepower, fuel e¢ ciency and the fraction of diesel cars all
increased between 19982011, whereas prices (relative to income) remained fairly stable.
Table 2 provides more detailed summary statistics broken down between gasoline and
diesel cars. The share of new diesel car sales increased from 31.7% in 1998 to 57.7% in
2011.14 Also the supply of diesel engines has increased proportionately more than that of
gasoline engines: there were on average only 1.6 diesel engines per car in 1998 (compared
with 2.5 gasoline engines per car), and this number increased to 2.5 diesel engines per car
in 2011 (and 3.0 gasoline engines per car). Diesel cars have 19% higher fuel e¢ ciency than
gasoline cars (on average 4.8 liter/100km for diesel cars versus 5.7 liter/100km for gasoline
cars in 2011). Furthermore, as mentioned above, diesel fuel tends to be 16% less expensive
than gasoline fuel costs. At the same time, a diesel car is on average 29% more expensive
than its gasoline counterpart.
More generally, the variation in the up-front purchase price and the expected fuel costs
across cars will be of primary importance to identify the extent to which consumers discount
the future. This variation comes from three sources: di¤erences between diesel and gasoline
engines, di¤erences between engines within a fuel type, and fuel price changes over time. To
assess the importance of each source, we regress our fuel cost variable on all other control
variables included in the main specication, and then partition the variance of the residual
13In the appendix, we re-estimate the model estimated below by rescaling the UK-survey distribution
around the mean from Eurostat for each country. This gives very similar results with a somewhat higher
willingness to pay for fuel economy. We prefer to rely on the UK distribution for the main results below
because most of the variance in the EUROSTAT data comes from di¤erent underlying measurements by
governments.
14This trend is common to all European countries, but there are also notable di¤erences across countries
(not shown in the table). Belgium, France and Spain reached the highest share of diesel cars in 2011
(respectively 75.2%, 69.0% and 69.0%), whereas the Netherlands had the lowest share (30.5%). The shares
of diesel cars in the other countries varied between 45.5% and 55.4%. These di¤erences may stem from
unobserved country-specic factors, such as taxes or fuel station networks. To account for this, we interact
the diesel variation with country-specic xed e¤ects.
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fuel costs. We nd that variation in fuel prices over time explains less than 0.01% of the total
variance of fuel costs. Di¤erences between gasoline and diesel engines explain 14% of the
variance in fuel costs, and di¤erences between engines with the same fuel type explain the
remaining 86% of variance in fuel costs. Hence, most of the variation in fuel costs comes from
engine variation (between and within fuel type). This is di¤erent from the existing literature,
which has mainly relied on di¤erences in fuel prices over time to identify the extent to which
consumers discount future fuel cost savings.
4 Estimation
We have a panel of T markets, dened as country-year combinations, to estimate the taste
parameters of the market share system (6). We reintroduce the subscript t to refer to these
markets. For each market t and each car model j with engine k, we observe the sales qjkt,
prices pjkt, fuel consumption ejkt, a vector of other product characteristics xjkt and the fuel
price gkt (gasoline or diesel fuel). The observed market shares are computed as the sales qjkt
divided by the number of potential consumers It, sjkt = qjkt=It, and these observed shares
are set equal to the predicted shares as given by (6).
We rst discuss the specication of the taste parameters. Next, we discuss the assump-
tions regarding the error term jk and the GMM estimator. Finally, we discuss specic
computational aspects of the estimator.
Specication of the taste parameters The taste parameters to be estimated are 
and , where  measures the extent to which consumers trade o¤ the initial purchase price
of a car against annual fuel costs, and  is a vector of distributional parameters for the
random coe¢ cients i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i ) with distribution F(; ). Recall that 
x
i measures
the individual-specic valuations for the product characteristics xjkt, i is the marginal
utility of income, and mi is consumer is annual mileage. As discussed in section 2,  is
not separately identied from the scale of mi . Furthermore, estimating a large number of
distributional parameters , i.e. means and (co)variances, is computationally challenging, so
we impose a number of restrictions.
First, we assume that mi follows the empirical distribution of mileage. The mileage
distribution we observe (discussed in section 3) is a conditional distribution, i.e. conditional
on having purchased a car, while we need the unconditional distribution in our empirical
model. In Appendix A.3 we show how to map the observed conditional distribution into
the unconditional distribution for mi . Incorporating the empirical distribution of mileage
avoids a restrictive functional form and also ensures identication of . Second, following
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the previous literature, we assume xi is normally distributed and we only estimate means
and standard deviations of xi , so we restrict their covariances to be equal to zero:
xi = 
x
+ xxi ;
where 
x
are the mean valuations,  is a diagonal matrix with standard deviations x on the
diagonal, and xi are standard normal random variables. Third, we specify i to be inversely
proportional to income yt in market t, so i = =yt.15
The specication of the conditional indirect utility of consumer i for car model j and
engine variant k then becomes
uijkt = xjkt
x
i   pjkt=yt   mi ejktgkt=yt + jkt + "ijkt: (7)
We will directly estimate and report  as the fuel cost parameter, and then retrieve
the future valuation parameter  from dividing the estimate of  by the estimate of the
price parameter  and a value of the capitalization coe¢ cient  (using the interest rate r
and time horizon S). The vector of product characteristics xjkt includes horsepower, size
(width times length), height, foreign, and a diesel dummy variable interacted by country
dummy variables. The latter captures valuation di¤erences for diesel engines across countries,
including unobserved di¤erences in taxation or in fuel station networks for diesel cars. We
estimate mean valuations x for all these variables, and in addition standard deviations x
for horsepower, size and foreign. In the Appendix we report specications with additional
random coe¢ cients: this gives similar results, but less precise estimates for some our main
parameters of interest. This is consistent with earlier ndings of Reynaert and Verboven
(2014) on the di¢ culties in precisely estimating too many random coe¢ cient parameters.
GMM estimator We exploit the panel nature of our dataset and specify the unobserved
product characteristic as
jkt = j + t +
ejkt; (8)
15Similar to Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), this specication approximates a Cobb-Douglas specica-
tion  ln (yt   pjkt   mi ejktgkt)  yt pjkt=yt mi ejktgkt=yt, when capitalized car expenditures
are small relative to capitalized income. It is particularly convenient in our setting with many countries
with di¤ering exchange rates, because prices and fuel expenditures are expressed in local prices relative
to local income. We also considered a specication where i follows the empirical distribution of income,
i = =yi, in a simpler specication with fewer other random coe¢ cients. This produced similar results,
but was computationally much slower, so we focus on the model where i = =yt and a richer set of other
random coe¢ cients.
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where j are xed e¤ects capturing time-invariant unobserved characteristics for a car model
j, and t captures market xed e¤ects, modeled as country-specic xed e¤ects interacted
with a time trend and a squared time trend. Since some models where introduced or elimi-
nated within a year, we also include a set of xed e¤ects for the number of months for which
the model was available in a country within a given year. The last term, ejkt, is the residual
error term capturing the remaining unobserved characteristics varying across models, engines
and markets. Since we include a full set of car model xed e¤ects, the demand parameters
are identied from variation across engine variants within car models.
The error terms ejkt enter the market share system (6) in a highly nonlinear way. Follow-
ing Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) and the subsequent literature, we use
a contraction mapping to invert the market share system and solve for the vector of error
terms et in each market t.
We account for the fact that price is an endogenous variable, which may be correlated
with the error term ejkt. The main identication assumption is that the error term is mean
independent of the other product characteristics, E(ejktjzt) = 0, where zt is a matrix of all
other product characteristics (including xt, but also fuel consumption et and fuel prices gt).
This assumption requires that all product characteristics, except prices, are uncorrelated
with unobserved car variant quality, conditional on the car model xed e¤ects. This appears
reasonable in the short run when manufacturers cannot easily redesign their products. To
the extent ejkt is correlated with the observed product characteristics, this may potentially
bias the parameters.
These conditional moment restrictions imply an innite number of unconditional moment
restrictions
E

hjt(xt)ejkt = 0
where hjt(xt) is a vector of instruments formed by any function of the exogenous xt. The
GMM estimator for the complete vector of parameters is then the solution to
min

e()0h(z)0
h(z)e();
where the vectors and matrices are stacked over all markets,  is the vector of parameters
( and ) and 
 is a weighting matrix using rst-step residuals to account for heteroskedas-
ticity.16 To construct the instruments h(z), we follow Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
and use the own-product characteristics, sums of the characteristics of other products of the
16To minimize the objective function, we concentrate out the linear parameters  and the market xed
e¤ects t as discussed in Nevo (1999). Furthermore, following Baltagi (1995), we use a within transformation
of the data to eliminate the car model xed e¤ects j .
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same rm, and sums of characteristics of other rmsproducts. These instruments inuence
the mark-ups of the di¤erentiated products and therefore serve as instruments for price.
We also considered cost shifters as alternative instruments for price: following Reynaert and
Verboven (2014) we interact steel prices and unit labor costs with the product characteristics
as product-level cost shifters. Since steel prices and labor costs were not available for the
year and country of production of about 8% of the observations, we do not take this as our
main specication, but report the results in the appendix.
We use these instruments in a rst stage to obtain initial parameter estimates and con-
struct optimal instruments following Chamberlain (1987) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes
(1999). In a second stage, we use these optimal instruments to obtain more e¢ cient parame-
ter estimates, especially for the variances of the random coe¢ cients. Reynaert and Verboven
(2014) provide detailed Monte Carlo evidence and an application with actual data to demon-
strate that optimal instruments indeed greatly improve the e¢ ciency of the estimator for
this model.
Computational considerations We account for a variety of computational issues to
which recent work has drawn attention (see for example Goldberg and Hellerstein (2013)s
checklist). First, we approximate the high-dimension market share integral using 500 draws
of a quasi-random number sequence for each of the 98 markets. The empirical distribution of
mileage consists of 100 nodes, such that each mileage is interacted with 5 draws on the other
dimensions. Second, we use a tight convergence level of 1e 12 for the contraction mapping to
solve the market share system in the inner loop within the GMM objective function. Third,
to minimize the GMM objective function we use a state-of-the-art optimization algorithm
(the Interior/Direct algorithm in Knitro), provide analytical derivatives and set a strict
tolerance level at 1e 6. Fourth, we use a set of 50 starting values to search for a global
minimum, and verify the solution by checking the rst-order and second-order conditions.
Finally, as discussed above, we use optimal instruments in a second stage, which greatly
improves the e¢ ciency of the estimator, in particular for the standard deviations of the
random coe¢ cients.
5 Empirical results
Although the importance of heterogeneity in consumer preferences has been emphasized
in other work, the specic implications on how this may a¤ect the estimated valuation of
future fuel cost savings has received limited attention. To assess how ignoring heterogeneity
of consumer preferences may bias the extent to which consumers trade o¤ the car purchase
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price against future fuel cost savings, we compare three alternative models. The rst model
is a simple logit model which imposes xi = 
x and mi = 
m (i.e. the mean of the observed
mileage distribution). The second model allows for heterogeneity in mileage and hence in
the valuation of fuel costs, using the empirical mileage distribution mi , while continuing to
restrict xi = 
x. The third model is our full random coe¢ cients model which allows for both
mileage heterogeneity and heterogeneity in the valuations of some other car characteristics.
We rst discuss the parameter estimates, and then what these imply for consumers
valuations of future fuel cost savings.
Parameter estimates Table 3 reports the parameter estimates for these three demand
models. First consider the simple logit model. Price and annual fuel costs have the expected
negative e¤ect on utility, with  =  4:52 and  =  39:03.17 This implies  = 8:63,
which we discuss in detail below. The price parameter  is in line with previous results in
the literature. In the appendix (Table B.1) we show that not using any instruments leads
to a very low estimated price elasticity. We also present the rst stage of the instrumental
variable regression, and nd that the excluded instruments correlate strongly with prices
and are jointly signicant with an F-stat of 291. Finally, we re-estimate the logit model with
cost shifters as additional instrumental variables, and this leads to very similar results.
The estimated mean valuations x for horsepower, size (length times width) and height
are positive, while the mean valuation for foreign cars is negative. The valuation of a
diesel engine (apart from fuel costs) di¤ers across countries (not shown in table): diesel
cars have a lower mean utility in Germany, the UK and especially in the Netherlands. This
may be due to unobserved higher car taxes, less elaborated diesel fuel station network,
the popularity of alternative fuels (such as LPG in the Netherlands) or other unobserved
preference di¤erences.18
Now consider the random coe¢ cients logit model with only mileage heterogeneity, and
no heterogeneity for other characteristics (RC Logit I). Price and fuel costs again have
the expected negative e¤ect on utility, and the magnitude of the fuel cost e¤ect slightly
decreases ( =  6:22 and  =  46:48). The estimated mean valuations of the other
product characteristics x all have the same signs and are similar in magnitude as in the
simple logit model.
Finally, consider the full random coe¢ cients logit with heterogeneity for other charac-
teristics (x) in addition to fuel costs (RC Logit II). As in the other two models, price
17Table B.2 replicates Table 3 with mileages from Eurostat instead of the UK survey.
18Table B.5 presents the results for the logit model, estimated separately for each of the countries. The
parameter estimates have robust signs, and with some exceptions the magnitudes of the e¤ects are broadly
comparable.
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and fuel costs have a negative e¤ect on utility. Similarly, the mean valuation for size and
height is positive, while the mean valuation for foreign cars is negative. The mean valuation
for horsepower now becomes insignicant, but there is substantial heterogeneity around the
mean, implying that about half of the consumers value horsepower positively. There is also
signicant heterogeneity in the valuation of size, but essentially all consumers have a posi-
tive valuation. The standard deviation for the valuation of foreign cars is not signicantly
di¤erent from zero.
We considered a detailed sensitivity analysis with respect to various assumptions of our
demand model. Table B.2 presents parameter estimates under alternative measures of our
fuel cost variable: the use of average fuel prices per market (taking out the variation in
fuel prices over time); the use of futures prices instead of spot prices; and the use of mean
mileage reported by Eurostat for each country instead of the UK survey. The empirical
results remain very similar. Intuitively, this is because fuel cost variation is more important
across engines and fuel types than over time or countries, as discussed above.
Table B.3 presents alternative specications for our base random coe¢ cients model (RC
Logit II): a model that includes a random coe¢ cient for fuel type (RC Logit III), a model
that adds heterogeneity in the valuation of fuel costs for other reasons than mileage (RC
Logit IV),19 and a model that allows vehicle lifetime to vary according to the consumers
annual mileage (RC Logit V).20 For all specications we obtain similar empirical results. We
therefore focus our subsequent analysis on the base specication RC Logit II, but will also
provide robustness analysis in the counterfactuals for the other models.
Implications for valuation of future fuel cost savings What do our estimates imply
for consumersvaluations of future fuel cost savings? To address this question, the starting
point is the coe¢ cient , which converts annual fuel costs into the present discounted
value. It is simply the ratio of the estimated fuel cost coe¢ cient  over the estimated
19More specically, we follow Anderson, Kellogg, and Sallee (2013), who report additional heterogeneity in
the valuation of fuel costs for other reasons than mileage such as discounting and forecasting. Specically, we
increase the variance of fuel costs across sampled individuals with a factor of 7 by adding additional normal
distributed draws to each mileage type. In this way 85% of the variation between sampled individuals comes
from other sources than mileage. This additional heterogeneity in fuel cost expectations may also impact
our tax comparison as we assess below.
20We assume a vehicles maximum lifetime distance is max = 250; 000km, so that the vehicle lifetime of
individual i is Si = 
max=mi (up to the nearest integer) Furthermore, we assume a scrapping rate  s in
year s (based on Table 1 of Jacobsen and van Benthem (2015) and setting  20 = 1). The present value of
fuel costs over a cars lifetime then becomes:
Gijk =
SiX
s=1
(1 + r) s (1   s)mi ejkgks:
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price coe¢ cient . As discussed above, we can then use the expression of  given by (4) to
draw conclusions about consumersintertemporal preferences. More specically, we follow
Allcott and Wozny (2014), and assume a time horizon S and market interest rate r to
obtain a value for  and retrieve the attention weight or future valuation parameter : this
measures the extent to which consumers undervalue ( < 1) or overvalue the future ( > 1).
Alternatively, as in Hausman (1979), we can set set  = 1 and assume a time horizon S to
retrieve the consumersimplicit interest rate r; or we can set  = 1 and r = 0 to retrieve the
consumersrequired payback time.
The bottom panel of Table 3 compares the ndings for the three di¤erent demand models.
To compute , we set r = 6% as in Allcott and Wozny (2014) and assume a time horizon
S = 15: this is at the higher end of Eurostat estimates of expected vehicle life between
S = 10 and S = 15, which makes it more likely to nd undervaluation of future payo¤s.21
The logit model implies that  = 8:63, which is precisely estimated with a standard
error of 0.55. Setting  = 1 and r = 0, this can be interpreted as a required payback time of
8.63 years for an investment in a more fuel e¢ cient car. Equivalently, using the above values
of r and S, the implied attention weight parameter is  = 0:89, which implies a moderate
undervaluation of future fuel cost savings. Finally, setting  = 1, our estimates imply the
consumersimplicit interest rate is 7.9% when they use a time horizon S = 15, and it is 2.8%
when they use S = 10.
The random coe¢ cients logit model with only mileage heterogeneity implies slightly
more undervaluation: the required payback time () is 7:47 years, which corresponds to
an attention weight parameter of  = 0:77 and implicit interest rates in the range of 10.3%
(S = 15) and 5.7% (S = 10).
Finally, the full model, which also allows for heterogeneity in the valuation of other
product characteristics, results in a coe¢ cient of  = 8:84, so that the attention weight
parameter is  = 0:91. This again implies some moderate (but statistically insignicant)
undervaluation of future fuel cost savings.
In all models, the consumer surplus losses per vehicle from misoptimization are small:
e73 in the rst model, e328 in the second model, and e40 in the third model. Note that this
type of low undervaluation may be interpreted as rational inattention from the consumers
point of view, if it is costly to compute future fuel savings exactly, see Sallee (2014).
In sum, we nd only moderate undervaluation with an attention weight of  = 0:91 for
European consumers. This is similar to Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2013), and higher
21Allcott and Wozny (2014) use a richer model for vehicle life, allowing for an annual depreciation rate.
In principle, we could also adopt such an approach, but this would make the expressions less transparent
and make the model more di¢ cult to estimate. It is in any case not clear whether consumers are su¢ ciently
sophisticated to incorporate all this information.
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than the  = 0:76 obtained by Allcott and Wozny (2014). As such, the European car market
shows only very limited evidence for an energy paradox according to which consumers
are puzzlingly slow in investing in energy e¢ ciency (Ja¤e and Stavins, 1994). A possible
explanation is the rather high fuel prices in Europe, which makes it more protable for
consumers to pay attention to future fuel costs. Furthermore, almost every car comes with
either a gasoline engine and a diesel engine (with a higher initial purchase price, but also
lower future fuel costs): this makes it easier to compare products that are otherwise nearly
identical (see also Verboven, 2002). We now turn to the question what these ndings imply
for the e¤ectiveness and welfare impact of alternative tax policies.
6 Policy counterfactuals
As shown in the previous section, to obtain reliable estimates of consumersvaluations of
future fuel cost savings it is important to account for consumer heterogeneity, both regarding
their mileage and other dimensions. What do our ndings imply for the e¤ectiveness and
the welfare impact of alternative tax policies?
As discussed in section 2, we discuss the impact of two tax policies: a fuel tax tGk (on
gasoline and/or diesel fuel) and a product tax tEk (on a cars fuel consumption ejk). Both
taxes are representative for a broader group of policies that governments can use in order
to reduce externalities. A fuel tax is equivalent to a carbon tax and can be seen as a
Pigouvian tax that directly prices the externality. A product tax changes the relative prices
of products with di¤erent e¢ ciencies and will have similar e¤ects as subsidies for e¢ cient
vehicles, feebates or fuel economy standards.
In subsection 6.1 we compare the e¤ectiveness of a fuel tax and a product tax in terms
of their capability to reduce total fuel usage. To make this comparison, we start from a fuel
tax increase by 50c per liter, which is about twice the size of the fuel tax of 1$ per gallon
often considered in several US studies. We compare this with a revenue-equivalent product
tax per unit of fuel consumption ejk (in liter/100km), i.e. a product tax that generates the
same revenues as the capitalized expected revenues from the fuel tax increase by 50c.
In subsection 6.2 we compare the total welfare impact of the fuel tax and product tax. We
rst calculate the impact of a fuel tax increase on total welfare. We then compare this with
an externality-equivalent product tax, which reduces the externality by the same amount.
We mainly focus on the results for Germany in 2011, the largest country in the most
recent year of our dataset. Computational details are given in Appendix A.
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6.1 E¤ectiveness of fuel versus product taxes
In this section we are mainly interested in the e¤ectiveness of both taxes in terms of their
capability to reduce total fuel usage, but to provide background information we rst discuss
how both taxes a¤ect the composition of new car sales and the sales-weighted average fuel
consumption (where, as discussed earlier, fuel consumption is the inverse of fuel economy).
As an extension we also compare the e¤ects of discriminatory taxes by fuel type (gasoline
versus diesel), and show how these help to explain the market share of diesel cars across
European countries.
In section 2 we already discussed that the price sensitivity parameter i and the extent
substitution to the outside good si0 determine the general demand impact of both taxes,
whereas the future valuation parameter  and the extent of mileage heterogeneity mi explain
the di¤erences in their impact. We now show how this can be translated empirically.
E¤ects on the composition of new car sales To evaluate how a fuel and product tax
a¤ect the composition of new car sales we take into account that these taxes may a¤ect
car prices, assuming multi-product Bertrand competition. In Appendix B we show the
results when car prices are not a¤ected (as under perfect competition). More specically, we
compute the e¤ect of both taxes on the sales and prices of every car jk, and then aggregate
these e¤ects to market share and price e¤ects of four fuel consumption quartiles. This is
similar to what Busse, Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2013) report for fuel taxes, based on an
entirely di¤erent identication approach. Since our approach is based on the estimates of
a structural demand model, we can report interesting additional information. First, we can
compare the impact of a fuel tax on the market shares with the impact of a (revenue-
equivalent) product tax. Second, we are able to compute the market share e¤ects not only
under the actual estimate of the future valuation parameter ( = 0:91), but also under
alternative scenarios with full forward looking behavior ( = 1) and strong consumer myopia
( = 0:5). This more detailed comparison provides useful background intuition to interpret
the di¤erent impact of both taxes on the average fuel consumption of the sold cars and on
total fuel usage.
Table 4 shows the tax e¤ects by fuel consumption quartile, based on the estimates of
the full model with heterogeneity in both mileage and in the valuation of other product
characteristics. According to the top panel of Table 4, under the actual future valuation
parameter ( = 0:91) a 50c fuel tax increase raises the market share of cars in the lowest fuel
consumption quartile by 2.2 percentage points (from a market share of 36.6% to 38.8%). The
market shares of the other fuel consumption quartiles all drop. In particular, the market
share of cars in the highest fuel consumption quartile drops by 0.7 percentage points (or
22
12%). Hence, a fuel price increase implies a quite considerable change in the composition
of car sales from the high to the low fuel consumption cars.22 If consumers would be fully
forward looking ( = 1), the fuel tax increase would only have a slightly larger impact on
the composition of car sales. Conversely, with strong consumer myopia ( = 0:5) the fuel
tax increase would have had a smaller impact. Notice nally that the taxes have only a
small impact on average car prices, implying that there is a high degree of tax pass-through.
Because of this, the tax e¤ects are similar under perfect competition, as shown in Appendix
(Table B.6).23
The bottom part of Table 4 compares these ndings with those of a revenue-equivalent
product tax increase. This amounts to a tax of e699 per unit of unit of fuel consumption
ejk (so this would amount to a product tax of e3,495 for a car that consumes 5 liter per
100km). Under the actual estimate of  = 0:91, the product tax increase has a larger e¤ect
on the composition of new car sales than the fuel tax. This is also the case if consumers
would be fully forward looking, and even more strongly so under strong consumer myopia
( = 0:5).
E¤ects on sales-weighted average fuel consumption and total fuel usage Table
5 shows how these sales composition e¤ects translate into the sales-weighted average fuel
consumption and the total annual fuel usage. To make a clean comparison across the spec-
ications, we set  = 1 because for all models  was indeed close to one. In the Appendix
(Table B.7), we show the results under consumer myopia ( = 0:5).
It is instructive to start with the results from the simple logit model without mileage and
other heterogeneity (rst two rows of Table 5). In this case, the fuel tax and the product
tax have the same impact: they both improve average fuel consumption by 2.2% and reduce
total fuel usage by 31.9%. This is as expected since consumers are forward looking and all
have the same mileage. Note that the large magnitude of the total fuel usage reduction is
due to an implausibly large substitution to the outside good in the simple logit model.
In the random coe¢ cients logit with mileage heterogeneity (RC Logit I) and additional
heterogeneity (RC Logit II), the fuel tax has a smaller impact on the sales-weighted average
fuel consumption than the product tax. This is consistent with our earlier nding that a
22These numbers are somewhat lower, but still of a comparable order of magnitude as those in Busse,
Knittel, and Zettelmeyer (2013), based on an entirely di¤erent identication approach. This may be because
of a generally larger cost sensitivity (with respect to prices and fuel costs) in the U.S., or because of a
di¤erent identication approach.
23The high tax pass-through may be due to the assumption of constant marginal costs or the functional
form of the demand model. However, if pass-through would in practice be lower (say because of increasing
marginal costs), this would likely not di¤er much between the fuel and product taxes, given that there is
only limited undervaluation.
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fuel tax has a smaller impact on the composition of new car sales than a product tax under
consumer heterogeneity. More importantly, despite the smaller impact on the carsaverage
fuel consumption, the fuel tax has a larger impact on total fuel usage. According to RC Logit
II, the fuel tax reduces total fuel usage by 18.1%, whereas a product tax only reduces total
fuel usage by 12.0%. Intuitively, this is because the fuel tax mainly targets the high mileage
consumers, who are most likely to substitute to cars with a lower fuel consumption (better
fuel economy).24 This conclusion also holds under the actual estimate of  = 0:91 (instead
of  = 1). However, with stronger consumer myopia the conclusion would be reversed, and
a product tax becomes more e¤ective in reducing total fuel usage. For example, if  = 0:5,
a product tax would reduce total fuel usage by 15.2%, compared with a reduction by only
12.0% under a fuel tax (see Table B.7 in Appendix).
The remaining rows of Table 5 show a sensitivity analysis, based on the estimates of
extensions of the random coe¢ cients models presented in Table B.3: RC Logit III (extra
random coe¢ cient on fuel type), RC Logit IV (extra heterogeneity in fuel cost valuation
for other reasons than mileage), and RC Logit V (vehicle lifetime varying according to
consumers actual mileage). In all models, fuel taxes retain their advantage over product
taxes in reducing total fuel usage. However, especially in RC Logit IV, the di¤erence in
impact between both taxes becomes less pronounced: the targeting e¤ect is weaker because
consumers do not only sort based on mileage but also on other factors.
In sum, in all models where we account for mileage heterogeneity, a fuel tax is more
e¤ective than a product tax in reducing total fuel usage (despite the fact that it performs
worse in improving the average fuel consumption of the sold cars). Intuitively, this is because
a fuel tax better targets the high mileage consumers and consumers are su¢ ciently forward
looking to take these future fuel taxes into account. A product tax would only be more
e¤ective if there would be su¢ ciently strong consumer myopia.
E¤ects of discriminatory taxes by fuel type The above counterfactuals compared the
impact of fuel and product taxes, without discriminating between the fuel type. We now
consider the e¤ects of discriminatory fuel taxes. This is of broad interest, since countries are
increasingly using fuel-specic tax policies to encourage the adoption of cars with alternative
fuels (such as methanol). We consider here the e¤ects of discriminatory taxes towards
gasoline and diesel fuel. Most European countries have followed such a discriminatory policy
during the past decades, with considerably lower taxes for diesel than for gasoline fuel.
A justication of this policy was the promotion of diesel cars, which have much lower CO2
24This is conrmed from a breakdown by mileage quartile: the lowest mileage quartile reduces fuel usage
by much less than the largerst quartile (not shown in the table).
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emissions. More recently, there is an increasing pressure to harmonize the gasoline and diesel
fuel prices (up to the level of the gasoline fuel price), because of an increased awareness of
the negative e¤ects of diesel on local air quality, despite the lower CO2 emissions.25
Table 6 shows the e¤ects of a 50c gasoline and/or diesel fuel tax for the full random
coe¢ cients logit model. A 50c gasoline fuel tax increase would increase the diesel market
share by 13.7% points. This results in a disproportionate reduction of gasoline fuel usage
by 40.5% and in an increase of diesel fuel usage by 24.2%. Conversely, a 50c diesel fuel tax
increase would reduce the diesel market share by 12.3%, which results in a disproportionate
reduction of diesel fuel usage by 37.8% and in an increase in gasoline fuel usage of 27.7%.
There is a disproportionately greater impact on fuel usage than on market shares because
especially the high mileage consumers substitute in response to the taxes. As a robustness
check (Table B.8), we performed the same counterfactuals for RC Logit III (which includes a
random coe¢ cient for fuel type). We obtain similar conclusions, though the substitution be-
tween fuel types is lower. Finally, note that the shifts between fuel types are correspondingly
much smaller in a logit model without mileage heterogeneity (not shown).
In sum, a discriminatory fuel tax can imply a considerable shift in usage between fuel
types due to the presence of mileage heterogeneity. This nding may also be relevant for
policies towards other fuels (such as methanol).
Do discriminatory taxes explain the diesel market share in Europe? We now take
a di¤erent perspective, and ask to which extent the observed discriminatory fuel taxes and
di¤erences in fuel consumption can explain the market share of diesel cars across di¤erent
European countries over time. This serves as a further examination of the implications of
our model, and is also of independent interest in light of the importance of diesel cars in
Europe.
Table 7 shows the results. The rst three columns show the currently observed gaps in
fuel prices and fuel consumption between gasoline and diesel cars, and the diesel market
shares in the seven countries in 1998 and 2011. Diesel fuel was on average 20c per liter less
expensive than gasoline fuel in 1998. The highest diesel fuel discounts applied in Belgium,
France and the Netherlands (25c29c per liter), while there was no discount in the U.K.
The gap between the gasoline and diesel fuel price somewhat narrowed for all countries in
2011. Furthermore, diesel cars had a lower average fuel consumption of about 2 liter/100km
in 1998, and this advantage further improved in 2011. The lower fuel price and lower fuel
25Miravete, Moral, and Thurk (2014) stress these negative environmental e¤ects of diesel fuel, and analyze
how the favorable fuel taxation towards diesel cars in Europe may have protected European rms from
foreign competition.
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consumption coincides with market shares for diesel cars in the range of 15%52% in 1998,
and 30%75% in 2011.
The last three columns show how the diesel market share would change if the fuel price
gap and fuel consumption gap were eliminated. If the price of diesel fuel would be harmonized
to the level of gasoline fuel in 1998, the market share of diesel cars would have been 711%
lower (with the exception of the UK, where there was no fuel price gap). If in addition the
fuel consumption of diesel and gasoline cars would be equalized, the market share of diesel
cars would have been an additional 513% lower. In 1998, both factors together explain
about 40% of the diesel market share in Belgium, the UK and Spain, and an even larger
fraction of 53% in France and Italy, 67% in Germany and the Netherlands.26 By 2011, the
importance of both factors in explaining the diesel market share has diminished because
the gap between gasoline and diesel fuel prices narrowed, while diesel cars further gained in
popularity. Nevertheless, discriminatory fuel taxes and di¤erences in fuel consumption still
explain about 30% of the diesel market share across countries.27
6.2 Welfare e¤ects
We now compare the welfare impact of a fuel tax and a product tax. Total welfare is the
sum of tax revenues, consumer surplus and the environmental externalities from car usage.28
Following Allcott (2013), when consumers may undervalue future fuel costs, consumer surplus
is the sum of decision consumer surplus (the usual consumer surplus, at the level of the
undervaluation parameter ) and belief error (the di¤erence between actual and perceived
spending on fuel costs); see Appendix A.3 for details.
The impact of the taxes on tax revenues and on consumer surplus can be directly com-
puted from our demand estimates. To compute the impact on the environmental externalities
we proceed as follows. First, we calculate the externality per liter of fuel that justies the
current fuel tax levels (based on the rst-order conditions for welfare maximization), and we
nd this to be in the range of 1e to 1.04e per liter, depending on the specication.29 Next,
26Note that our model explains a considerably larger part of the diesel market share than Linn (2014),
who does not allow for heterogeneous consumer responses to fuel costs.
27In the Appendix (Table B.9) we show the results in an extended model with an additional random
coe¢ cient on fuel type (RC logit III). The results are qualitatively the same, but the magnitudes are smaller
because consumers substitute less between fuel types.
28To simplify the exposition, we assume car prices are set competitively, so that there is no producer
surplus. Our results are similar if we consider multi-product Bertrand-Nash pricing with constant marginal
costs.
29This is higher but of comparable order of magnitude than outside estimates of externality costs, which
attempt to directly estimate the cost of CO2 and other emissions, congestion costs and accident externalities.
For example, a recent IMF report (Parry et al. (2014)) estimates the total externality to be $0.58 for gasoline
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we assume the perceived public awareness of the externality per liter increases, and then
compare the impact of a fuel increase with the impact of an externality-neutralproduct
tax increase, i.e. a product tax increase that achieves the same level of externality reduction.
Table 8 shows the results. We provide a comparison between the simple logit benchmark
and the base specication (RC logit II), which accounts for mileage and other consumer
heterogeneity. The top panel considers a rst scenario: the impact of a tax increase after a
general increase in the externality by 20 cents (say because of an increase in car congestion).
In the logit model without mileage heterogeneity, a fuel tax and a product tax perform equally
well: they would both raise welfare by 265 million Euro. There is however a di¤erence in the
sources behind these gains. Under a fuel tax there is a larger increase in tax revenues than
under a product tax (+1565 million Euro versus +954 million Euro). But at the same time
consumers experience extra losses from their belief error (the so-called internality by Allcott
(2013)), while these losses go down under a product tax. Intuitively, a fuel tax raises more
tax revenues, but consumers are partly unaware of these extra taxes and the overall impact
of both taxes is the same.
In the random coe¢ cients model a fuel tax performs considerably better than an exter-
nality neutral product tax in correcting for the increased externality: it raises total welfare
by 186 million Euro, versus only by 112 million Euro for the product tax. This is essentially
due to the much lower impact of a fuel tax on decision consumer surplus (which decreases
by only 3.4 billion Euro versus 5.3 billion Euro under a product tax) because a lower tax
amount is required to achieve the same externality reduction when there is mileage hetero-
geneity. Intuitively, this is because fuel taxes directly target the high mileage consumers,
while product taxes a¤ect all consumers in the same way.
The bottom panel of Table 8 considers an alternative scenario: the impact of a diesel tax
increase after an increase in the externality of diesel cars. This reects current policy aware-
ness that diesel cars are not less polluting than gasoline cars (in terms of CO2 emissions),
but actually are likely more polluting (because of NOx and other emissions). To keep the
analysis simple, we separately calculate the externality per usage of gasoline and diesel that
rationalize the current gasoline and diesel taxation and then we raise the externality usage
of diesel to the same level of gasoline. The results give a similar picture: taxing diesel fuel or
diesel cars has the same impact on welfare in the absence of mileage heterogeneity, but taxing
diesel fuel is much more preferable than taxing diesel cars under mileage heterogeneity.
In sum, these ndings show that it is generally preferable to impose fuel taxes than
product taxes to correct for usage externalities, even when usage demand itself is perfectly
and $0.82 for diesel in Germany 2010, and $0.72 for gasoline and $0.95 for diesel in France.
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inelastic.
7 Conclusion
We have analyzed to which extent car buyers undervalue future fuel costs, and what this
implies for the e¤ectiveness of alternative tax policies. We specically demonstrated the
importance of accounting for consumer heterogeneity in car utilization and other dimensions.
To estimate the demand model, we used detailed data at the level of the car model and
engine variant for a panel of seven European countries during 1998-2011. The institutional
features of the European car market provided a new way to identify consumer responses to
fuel costs, because for most car models consumers can choose between either a gasoline and
diesel engine. To empirically identify consumer responses to fuel costs, we thus exploit fuel
price variation by fuel type (i.e. gasoline or diesel) across countries and over time, interacted
with variation in fuel consumption across products.
We nd evidence of only modest undervaluation of future fuel costs. To obtain this
estimate, it was important to account for both mileage heterogeneity and heterogeneity in
the valuation of other car characteristics. We then draw implications for the e¤ectiveness
of fuel taxes versus product taxes (based on a cars fuel consumption). Despite the modest
undervaluation, we nd that a fuel tax is more e¤ective in reducing fuel usage than a revenue-
equivalent product tax on fuel consumption, because it specically targets the high mileage
consumers to substitute to cars with a lower fuel consumption. Discriminatory taxes by fuel
type lead to disproportionately larger shifts in fuel type usage than in market shares, because
they especially target high mileage consumers. Furthermore, we nd that fuel taxes perform
much better in terms of total welfare to achieve a same level of externality reduction.
Because our framework makes use of aggregate demand data, it can be used to address
a variety of other environmental questions based on datasets for many countries over a long
time period. In future research, it would therefore be interesting to apply our framework to
investigate the e¤ects of specic policies that countries have followed over the past years.
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8 Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Gasoline and Diesel Prices across time and countries
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The top panel of the gure shows average yearly prices (in real 2005 e) of gasoline and diesel between
1998 and 2011. The bottom panel shows the di¤erence in gasoline and diesel prices for each of the
countries between 1998 and 2011. Source: DG ECFIN.
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Figure 2: UK mileage survey
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This gure shows the frequency distribution for the UK mileage survey in 2007. The left panel has
x-axis bins in 1000 of km travelled per year, the mean of the distribution is 14 761km travelled. The
right panel shows the distribution with equal sized 5000km bins and a plotted kernel.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
All years 1998 2011
Variable Mean St. Dev. Mean Mean
Sales (1,000 units) 1.8 5.1 2.7 1.3
Price/Income 1.1 0.7 1.1 1.1
Fuel consumption (li/100km) 7.3 2.1 7.8 6.3
Yearly Fuel Costs/Income (100) 4.3 1.5 4.7 4.3
Horsepower (in kW) 107.4 54.6 85.1 122.0
Size (1,000 cm2) 76.7 9.9 74.0 79.5
Height (cm) 148.5 10.7 144.1 150.1
Foreign (0-1) 0.9 0.4 0.8 0.9
Diesel (0-1) 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.5
Months market presence (1-12) 11.4 1.8 11.4 11.5
Number of observations 82,151 4,380 6,898
The table reports means and standard deviations of the main variables for all years and for years 1998
and 2011 separately. The total number of observations (model/engines combinations and markets)
is 82,166, where market refer to 7 countries and 14 years.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Engine Type
1998 2011
Gasoline Diesel Gasoline Diesel
Market Share (%) 68.3 31.7 42.3 57.7
# variants per model 2.5 1.6 3.0 2.5
Fuel consumption (li/100km) 7.4 6.2 5.7 4.8
Price/Income 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.9
The table reports summary statistics by engine type (gasoline and diesel) in year 1998 and 2011.
Fuel consumption and price/income are averages weighted by the number of units sold.
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Table 3: Parameter Estimates for Alternative Demand Models
Logit RC Logit I RC Logit II
Est. St.Err. Est. St.Err. Est. St.Err.
Mean valuations
Price/Inc. () -4.52 0.19 -6.22 0.22 -5.33 0.21
Fuel Costs/Inc. () -39.03 1.41 -46.48 0.94 -47.11 9.22
Power (kW/100) 2.28 0.14 2.60 0.17 0.25 0.61
Size (cm2/10,000) 13.25 0.44 16.69 0.48 16.77 2.02
Height (cm/100) 3.00 0.30 4.45 0.32 5.19 0.33
Foreign -0.83 0.02 -0.75 0.02 -0.89 0.04
Standard Deviations of valuations
Power (kW/100) - - - - 1.95 0.25
Size - - - - 4.31 2.04
Foreign - - - - 0.49 0.43
Mileage distribution No Yes Yes
Valuations of Future Fuel Costs
Fuel Costs/Price () 8.63 0.55 7.47 0.24 8.84 1.77
Future Valuation  (r = 6%) 0.89 0.06 0.77 0.02 0.91 0.18
Consumer Loss from Misoptim. (e) 73.07 328.13 39.71
Implicit Interes rate (T = 10) 2.77 5.69 2.31
Implicit Interes rate (T = 15) 7.87 10.32 7.48
The table reports the parameter estimates and standard errors for the di¤erent demand models. The logit
assumes homogeneous mileage (mi = 
m
) and homogeneous valuations for characteristics in xjkt (
x
i =

x
). The random coe¢ cients logit I assumes heterogeneous mileage (mi ) and homogeneous valuations
for all the other characteristics in xjkt (
x
i = 
x
). The random coe¢ cients logit II assumes heterogeneous
mileage (mi ) and heterogeneous valuations for characteristics in xjkt (
x
i ). Each specication includes
model, market/diesel and market/time controls. The total number of observations (combinations of
model/engine/market) is 82,151, where markets refer to 7 countries and 14 years. The lower panel
reports: (i) the Ratio Fuel Costs/Price (); which converts annual costs into their present discounted
value; (ii) the attention weight or future valuation parameter (); calculated assuming a market interest
rate r = 6% and an expected car longevity S = 15; (iii) the consumer surplus losses due to misoptimization
per vehicle in e; (iv) the implicit interest rate that sets  = 1 assuming a lifetime of 10 and 15 years.
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Table 4: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Market Shares by Fuel Consumption
Quartile
 = 0:50  = 0:91  = 1:00
Change in Market Share Current % Point e p % Point e p % Point e p
Fuel Tax
Tax per liter e0.50 e0.50 e0.50
Fuel Consumption Q1 (lowest) 37 1.5 -15 2.2 -31 2.4 -39
Fuel Consumption Q2 37 -0.3 -14 -0.4 -30 -0.5 -36
Fuel Consumption Q3 20 -0.6 -15 -1.0 -29 -1.1 -32
Fuel Consumption Q4 (highest) 6 -0.5 -16 -0.7 -21 -0.8 -23
Revenue Equivalent Product Tax
Tax per liter/100km e832 e699 e662
Fuel Consumption Q1 (lowest) 37 3.8 -41 3.0 -37 2.9 -37
Fuel Consumption Q2 37 -0.5 -47 -0.4 -44 -0.4 -43
Fuel Consumption Q3 20 -1.7 -52 -1.4 -47 -1.4 -45
Fuel Consumption Q4 (highest) 6 -1.5 -52 -1.2 -44 -1.1 -41
The table reports the e¤ects of a fuel tax and a revenue-equivalent product tax on the market shares
and prices of new cars aggregated by quartile of fuel consumption, under Bertrand-Nash pricing. The
e¤ects are computed under strong consumer myopia ( = 0:50), under the actual estimate of consumer
valuation of fuel costs ( = 0:91) and under full forward looking behavior ( = 1:00), on the basis of the
parameter estimates of RC Logit II in Table 3. The gures refer to Germany in 2011. Q1=quartile 1;
Q2=quartile 2; Q3=quartile 3; Q4=quartile 4.
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Table 5: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Fuel Consumption and Fuel Usage
Outside Good Fuel Consumption Fuel Usage
% Point Change % Change % Change
Logit
Fuel Tax 14.06 -2.16 -31.89
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 14.06 -2.16 -31.89
RC Logit I - Mileage Only
Fuel Tax 10.78 -0.80 -38.19
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 7.33 -1.49 -22.97
RC Logit II
Fuel Tax 5.71 -1.16 -18.13
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 4.84 -1.53 -12.00
RC Logit III - Extra RC on fuel cost
Fuel Tax 5.71 -0.95 -15.91
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 6.79 -1.56 -14.83
RC Logit IV - Extra heterog. in fuel cost
Fuel Tax 3.78 -1.85 -9.52
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 3.74 -1.96 -8.96
RC Logit V - Lifetime varies with miles
Fuel Tax 6.23 -1.17 -16.20
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 5.87 -1.29 -12.78
The table reports the e¤ect of a fuel tax and a revenue-equivalent product tax on the share of the outside
good, average fuel consumption, and total annual fuel usage. The simulations are based on the parameter
estimates in Table 3 and Table B.3. In each model we set  = 1, so there is no variation in undervaluation
across the di¤erent models. The gures refer to Germany in 2011.
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Table 6: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax on Gasoline and Diesel Separately
Fuel Usage Diesel Share
All cars Gasoline cars Diesel cars
% Change % Change % Change % Point Change
Fuel Tax, Gasoline only -9.7 -40.5 24.2 13.7
Fuel Tax, Diesel only -3.5 27.7 -37.8 -12.3
Fuel Tax, both Gas. and Diesel -16.8 -21.8 -11.4 2.4
The table reports the e¤ect of a discriminatory fuel tax for gasoline and diesel cars on total fuel usage.
The simulations are based on the parameter estimates of RC Logit II in Table 3. The gures refer to
Germany in 2011.
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Table 7: Explaining the Diesel Market Shares Across Countries
Current Situation Change in Diesel Share: Equalization of
Fuel price gap Fuel Cons. Gap Diesel Share Fuel Price Fuel Cons. Both
Year 1998
Belgium -0.25 -1.91 52% -10% -11% -21%
France -0.26 -2.04 38% -11% -9% -20%
Germany -0.22 -2.35 15% -5% -5% -10%
Great Britain 0.00 -2.24 15% 0% -6% -6%
Italy -0.19 -2.08 21% -7% -6% -13%
Netherlands -0.29 -2.12 21% -8% -6% -14%
Spain -0.11 -1.85 51% -9% -13% -21%
Year 2011
Belgium -0.24 -2.01 75% -4% -16% -20%
France -0.19 -1.81 69% -4% -13% -16%
Germany -0.16 -2.23 46% -4% -14% -18%
Great Britain 0.04 -2.04 50% 2% -14% -12%
Italy -0.13 -2.05 56% -3% -14% -18%
Netherlands -0.28 -2.22 30% -5% -12% -15%
Spain -0.07 -2.08 69% -2% -15% -17%
The table reports: (i) in the rst three columns, the currently observed gaps in fuel prices and fuel
consumption between gasoline and diesel cars, and the diesel market shares in the seven countries of our
dataset in 1998 (upper panel) and 2011 (lower panel); in the last three columns, how the diesel market
share would change if the fuel price gap and fuel consumption gap were eliminated. The simulations are
based on the parameter estimates of RC Logit II in Table 3.
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Table 8: The Welfare E¤ects of a Fuel Tax versus a Product Tax
Change in Mln Euro: Revenue Consumer Belief error Externality Welfare
surplus (internality)
Panel A: general externality increase and corrective taxes
Logit ( = 0:89)
Fuel Tax 1565 -335 -116 2165 265
Product Tax 954 -335 496 2165 265
RC Logit II ( = 0:91)
Fuel Tax 2246 -3409 -234 1584 186
Product Tax 3512 -5294 310 1584 112
Panel B: diesel externality increase and corrective diesel taxes
Logit ( = 0:89)
Fuel Tax 1009 -1389 -107 632 146
Product Tax 761 -1389 141 632 146
RC Logit II ( = 0:91)
Fuel Tax 1555 -1547 -185 364 187
Product Tax 2579 -2923 30 364 50
The table reports the e¤ects of a fuel tax and an externality-neutral product tax on welfare. Welfare
changes are the sum of changes in tax revenues, decision consumer surplus, belief error, and the envi-
ronmental externality. Panel A considers the e¤ect of (i) an increase in the price of fuel by 20 cents;
(ii) an increase in the externality by 20 cents above the level that justies the current fuel tax. Panel B
considers the e¤ect of (i) an increase in the price of diesel by 20 cents; (ii) an increase in the perceived
externality of diesel up to the level of that justies the current gasoline tax. The simulations are based
on the parameter estimates of RC Logit II in Table 3. The gures refer to Germany in 2011.
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APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION
A Appendix A. Computational details
In this Appendix, we rst derive the analytic expressions for the demand e¤ects of a fuel
tax and a product tax based on fuel economy. We then describe the specic approach to
implement the policy counterfactuals. Finally, we describe how we incorporate the empirical
millage distribution in our estimation.
A.1 Impact of small tax changes on demand
Assume for simplicity that the fuel tax and product tax is uniform, i.e. there is no distinction
between gasoline and diesel engine k. The individual choice probability for product jk of a
consumer i can be written as:
sijk

tG; tE ; i

=
exp(vijk)
1 +
PJ
j0
PKj0
k0=1 exp(vij0k0)
:
and total sales of product product jk under taxes (tG; tE) are:
qjk

tG; tE

=
Z

sijk

tG; tE ; 

dF()I;
where the individual utility minus extreme value random variable is dened as
vijk  xjkxi   i(pjk + tEejk + mi ejk

gk + t
G

) + jk:
The own- and cross-e¤ects of a change in individual utility on the individual choice
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probabilities take the usual form:
@sijk
@vijk
= sijk
 
1  sijk

@sijk
@vij0k0
=  sij0k0sijk:
The e¤ect of a uniform fuel tax tG on the individual choice probability is then:
@sijk
@tG
=  imi
X
j0
X
k0
@sijk
@vj0k0
ej0k0
=  imi sijk
0@ejk  X
j0
X
k0
sij0k0ej0k0
1A
=  imi sijk
0@ejk   (1  si0)X
j0
X
k0
ej0k0
sij0k0
1  si0
1A
=  imi sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

where
ei =
X
j0
X
k0
ej0k0
sij0k0
1  si0
is the expected fuel economy of consumer i.
The e¤ect of the fuel tax on total demand is then given by:
@qjk
@tG
=
Z

@sijk
@tG
dF()I
=  
Z

i
m
i sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I:
We can follow similar steps to compute the e¤ect of a product tax tE , so that the e¤ects of
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both taxes are summarized as:
@qjk
@tG
=  
Z

i
m
i sijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I
@qjk
@tE
=  
Z

isijk
 
ejk   ei + si0ei

dF()I;
which are the expressions presented in the main text. This shows several things. First, the
tax e¤ect is similar to a price elasticity of industry demand, except for the term ejk   ei.
If ejk   ei = 0, the e¤ect is just like elasticity of industry demand. If ejk > ei, then the
e¤ect is bigger (worst fuel e¢ cient cars loose most). If ejk   ei < 0, the e¤ect is smaller and
may easily turn positive. Second, the energy tax is di¤erent from product tax because of
 and mi . This can be conrmed from revenue equivalent tax below. Note also that the
expressions simplify if the outside good is absent (inelastic market demand). Then the sign
of the tax e¤ect simply depends on sign of ejk   ei.
A.2 Details on the policy counterfactuals
In this Appendix, we derive the expressions used in our policy counterfactuals to compute
the e¤ects of the fuel tax tGk and the product tax t
E
k on market shares, tax revenues, average
fuel consumption and total fuel usage, and the various welfare components: tax revenues,
decision consumer surplus, belief error (internality) and the externality.
Let k = 1 refer to gasoline, and k = 2 refer to diesel. Denote the vector of taxes by
(tG; tE), where tG = (tG1 ; t
G
2 ) is the energy tax vector, and t
E = (tE1 ; t
E
2 ) is the product tax
vector.
Sales We slightly modify some of the expressions in the previous subsection to account for
the fact that the fuel tax and product tax can vary per fuel type. The choice probability
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for product jk of a consumer i with a random coe¢ cient vector i = (
x
i ; i; 
m
i ) facing tax
vector tG and tE is:
sijk

tG; tE ; i

=
exp(vijk)
1 +
PJ
j0
PKj0
k0=1 exp(vij0k0)
;
where the individual utility minus the extreme value random variable is now dened with
non-uniform taxes as
vijk  xjkxi   i(pjk + tEk ejk + mi ejk

gk + t
G
k

) + jk:
Total sales of product product jk under taxes (tG; tE) are again:
qjk

tG; tE

=
Z

sijk

tG; tE ; 

dF()I
So the predicted quantity after a change in the fuel tax by G is qjk
 
tG +G; tE

and the
predicted quantity after a change in the product tax by E is qjk
 
tG; tE +E

. Based
on these predicted quantities per product jk we can compute the market shares per fuel
consumption quartile (or any other aggregated quantity or market share).
Tax revenues Conditional on buying product jk, an individual consumer pays taxes 
tEk + 
m
i t
G
k

ejk, i.e. the sum of the product tax plus capitalized future energy taxes.
Total tax revenues over all products jk are dened as:
R

tG; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k

tEk + 
m
i t
G
k

ejksijk

tGk ; t
E
k ; 

dF()I;
i.e. the expected tax revenue over all cars per consumer, averaged over all consumers. We
can then compute the tax revenues from a change in energy taxes R
 
tG +G; tE

or product
46
taxes R
 
tG; tE +E

as:
R

tG +G; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k
mi t
G
k ejksijk

tG +G; tE ; 

dF()I
R

tG; tE +E

=
Z

X
j
X
k
tEk ejksijk

tG; tE +E ; 

dF()I:
With uniform taxes, we consider an increase in the energy tax by 50c, G = 0:5, so that the
revenue-neutral product tax is the solution of E to R
 
tG + 0:5; tE

= R
 
tG; tE +E

.
Sales-weighted average fuel consumption and total energy usage Weighted average
fuel consumption (given that people purchase a car) is
E

tG; tE

=
X
j
X
k
ejk
qjk
 
tGk ; t
E
k ; 
m
i
P
j
P
k qjk
 
tGk ; t
E
k ; 
m
i
 ;
where
qjk

tG; tE

=
Z

sijk

tG; tE ; 

dF()I:
Total annual fuel usage is given by
F

tG; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k
mi ejksijk

tGk ; t
E
k ; 

dF()I:
This accounts for the fact that consumers may substitute to the outside good after a tax
increase, so that they do not consume any fuel.
Based on this, we can compute the percentage change in average fuel consumption and the
percentage change in fuel usage for both taxes. For example, the percentage change in average
fuel consumption after a fuel tax change by G is %E = E
 
tG +G; tG

=E
 
tG; tE
  1.
Welfare The rst welfare component consists of tax revenues, already derived above. The
second welfare component is experienced consumer surplus. Following Allcott (2013), this is
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equal to decision consumer surplus minus belief error. Decision consumer surplus is given
by the standard expression in logit models (aggregated over the distribution of consumer
valuations):
CS

tG; tE

=
Z

1
i
ln
0@1 +X
j
X
k
exp(vijk)
1A dF()I;
and belief error is the di¤erence between the actual and perceived fuel expenditures:
CSb

tG; tE

= (1  )
Z

X
j
X
k
mi

gk + t
G
k

ejksijk

tGk ; t
E
k ; 

dF()I:
Experienced consumer surplus is then CS
 
tG; tE

= CS
 
tG; tE
  CSb  tG; tE.
The nal welfare component is the externality. Let hk be the externality cost per liter
of fuel type k (which includes the CO2 costs, but also other pollution costs, congestion and
accident externalities). The externality is then given by:
EXT

tG; tE

=
Z

X
j
X
k
mi hkejksijk

tGk ; t
E
k ; 

dF()I
Total welfare is the sum of the various components:
W

tG; tE

= R

tG; tE

+ CS

tG; tE

  CSb

tG; tE

+ EXT

tG; tE

:
To perform our welfare analysis, we need a measure of the externality cost per liter hk for
each fuel type k. We compute both hk such that welfare is maximized at the current fuel tax
levels, i.e. such that @W=@tGk = 0 for each fuel type k. We then assume that hk increases by
a certain amount, and compare the welfare impact of a fuel tax and an externality-neutral
product tax, as discussed in the text.
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A.3 Incorporating the empirical mileage distribution
In both estimation and counterfactuals we make use of the empirical mileage distribution.
Suppose there are R mileage types, where for each type r = 1:::R there is a fraction r (such
that
PR
r=1 r = 1) and a corresponding mileage 
m
r . Total sales for product jk are
qjk =
XR
i=1
isrjk (
m
r )| {z }
sj
I;
where srjk (
m
i ) is the probability that mileage type r chooses product jk (i.e. the integral
of the individual choice probabilities over all heterogeneity other than mileage).
In practice, we do not observe the unconditional mileage fractions r, but rather the
fractions lr conditional on buying a car. Based on these observed conditional fractions, total
sales for product jk can also be written as
qjk =
XR
i=1
lisrjkjB (mr )Q;
where srjkjB (mr ) = srjk (
m
i ) =
PJ
j=1
P
k srjk (
m
i ) is the conditional probability that mileage
type r chooses jk, conditional on buying a car. from equating the above two expressions, it
follows that
i = li  (Q=I) =
XJ
j=1
X
k
srjk (
m
i ) ;
where Q =
PJ
j=1
P
k qjk. We use this to write all expressions in terms of the observed
conditional mileage fractions.
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B Appendix B. Additional Tables
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Table B.1: Alternative Instruments and First Stage
Full Sample Cost Sample
No IV Sums IV Sums IV Cost IV All IVs
Est. St.Er. Est. St.Er. Est. St.Er. Est. St.Er. Est. St.Er.
Price/Inc. () -0.03 0.03 -4.52 0.19 -4.39 0.18 -3.09 0.22 -3.96 0.16
Fuel Cost/Inc. -53.90 1.02 -39.03 1.41 -41.67 1.29 -45.25 1.28 -42.86 1.26
Power -7.18 0.29 2.28 0.14 2.37 0.13 1.45 0.16 2.06 0.12
Size 12.9 0.31 13.25 0.44 15.29 0.39 14.52 0.38 15.03 0.38
Height 2.56 0.23 3.00 0.30 4.25 0.28 3.80 0.27 4.10 0.28
Foreign -1.06 0.02 -0.83 0.02 -0.86 0.02 -0.92 0.02 -0.88 0.02
# Obs. 82 151 76 634
First Stage - Excluded Instruments
Sums of all other vehiclescharacteristics:
Fuel Cost/Inc. -1.23 0.11 -1.25 0.11 -0.92 0.12
Power -2.02 0.61 -2.00 0.66 -1.96 0.65
Size 3.09 0.35 -3.04 0.37 2.61 0.38
Height 3.66 3.14 4.03 3.35 9.12 3.26
# products -2.24 0.51 -2.24 0.57 -2.27 0.57
Sums of own rm other vehicles characteristics:
Fuel Cost/Inc. 2.72 0.43 2.61 0.45 2.52 0.44
Power -2.80 0.39 -2.83 0.41 -2.62 0.38
Size 8.65 1.84 8.49 1.89 7.96 1.75
Height 7.03 1.81 7.11 1.91 7.04 1.86
# products -1.47 0.31 -1.46 0.32 -1.43 0.31
Cost Shifters
Labor Costs 4.08 0.56 2.28 0.43
Local Prod. -1.87 0.93 -1.69 0.88
We*Steel Pr. -3.33 0.62 -1.69 0.62
Joint F Stat Exc.Instr. (p-val)
291 (0.0) 273 (0.0) 531 (0.0) 237 (0.0)
The table reports the parameter estimates and standard errors for the rst stage and second stage of
the IV regression. The rst panel gives the estimated demand parameters for the logit model, the other
panels gives rst stage estimates for excluded instruments. Column I gives results for the OLS. Column II
replicates the logit model presented in the main paper. Columns III-V give results using a smaller sample
for which we obtained cost shifter instrument: labor costs, local production and steel prices. Column III
uses the same instruments as the main specication in the paper but in the smaller sample. Column IV
shows the results when only relying on cost shifter instruments. Column V includes both cost shifters
and the instrument set used in the main paper. Note that all regressions include model xed e¤ects,
the cost shifters thus only vary when versions are produced in di¤erent plants, or when a model moves
between production plants over time.
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Table B.2: Parameter Estimates for Alternative Demand Models Part I
Logit Av. FC Logit Futures Logit Eurostat RC Logit Eurostat
Est. St.Err. Est. St.Err. Est. St.Err. Est. St.Err.
Mean valuations
Price/Inc. () -2.90 0.17 -4.14 0.18 -4.19 0.22 -5.96 0.25
Fuel Costs/Inc. () -44.16 1.21 -56.79 1.13 -48.10 1.82
Av. Fuel Cost () -28.17 1.13
Power (kW/100) 1.04 0.12 2.21 0.13 2.41 0.16 -0.77 0.34
Size (cm2/10,000) 14.64 0.35 15.40 0.37 15.34 0.37 19.87 0.47
Height (cm/100) 3.63 0.25 3.86 0.02 3.92 0.27 5.99 0.33
Foreign -0.92 0.02 -0.85 0.02 -0.84 0.02 -1.85 0.08
Standard Deviations of valuations
Power (kW/100) - - - - - - -2.67 0.10
Size (cm2/10,000) - - - - - - 0.17 1.18
Foreign - - - - - - 4.74 0.26
Mileage distribution No No No Recentered
Valuations of Future Fuel Costs
Fuel Costs/Price () 9.71 0.84 10.75 0.62 13.54 0.71 8.08 0.41
Future Valuation  1.00 0.09 1.11 0.06 1.39 0.07 0.83 0.04
The table reports the parameter estimates and standard errors for the di¤erent demand models. The Table presents
similar results as Table 3 but with di¤erent denitions of fuel costs. In Logit Av. FC, we leave out all variation in fuel
prices over time and estimate the model with average fuel costs per market. In Logit Futures, we compute fuel costs
by rescaling fuel spot prices by the percentage di¤erence in crude oil spot price and the futures prices from NYMEX
(taking an average of futures prices over 1 up to 15 years). In Logit Eurostat we change the mean mileage to the
mean mileage reported by Eurostat for each country. In RC Logit Eurostat we introduce heterogeneous mileage, with
Eurostat means and a rescaling of the UK mileage distribution around that mean. Each specication includes model,
market/diesel and market/time controls. The total number of observations (combinations of model/engine/market)
is 82,151, where markets refer to 7 countries and 14 years.
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Table B.3: Parameter Estimates for Alternative Demand Models Part II
RC Logit III RC Logit IV RC Logit V
Est. St.Err. Est. St.Err. Est. St.Err.
Mean valuations
Price/Inc. () -5.25 0.20 -5.91 0.20 -4.82 1.32
Fuel Costs/Inc. () 40.59 6.27 -57.32 3.23 - -
iFuel Costs/Inc. () - - - - -4.61 1.27
Power (kW/100) -0.68 1.50 -0.52 0.10 -2.27 1.06
Size (cm2/10,000) 17.46 1.22 19.56 0.48 18.26 1.98
Height (cm/100) 5.22 0.33 5.81 0.32 5.44 1.03
Foreign -0.91 0.02 -1.14 0.04 -0.97 0.11
Standard Deviations of valuations
Power (kW/100) 2.33 0.07 2.56 0.06 2.98 0.91
Size (cm2/10,000) 3.62 1.36 0.70 0.15 3.30 0.68
Foreign 0.21 0.36 3.04 0.24 0.47 2.30
Fuel type 1.65 0.40 - -
Mileage distribution Yes Yes Yes
Valuations of Future Fuel Costs
Fuel Costs/Price () 7.74 1.35 9.71 0.51 - -
Future Valuation  (r = 6%) 0.80 0.14 1.00 0.05 0.96 0.52
The table reports the parameter estimates and standard errors for the di¤erent demand models. The
Table presents similar results as Table 3 but with di¤erent assumptions. RC Logit III introduces a random
coe¢ cient on fuel type. RC Logit IV increases the variance of the mileage distribution across individuals.
RC Logit V allows vehicle lifetime to depend on a consumers annual mileage. Each specication includes
model, market/diesel and market/time controls. The total number of observations (combinations of
model/engine/market) is 82,151, where markets refer to 7 countries and 14 years.
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Table B.4: Parameter Estimates for Alternative Demand Models Part II
Implied  St.Err. Implied  St.Err.
S = 10 S = 15
Logit
r = 0% 0.91 0.07 0.61 0.04
r= 3% 1.04 0.08 0.74 0.05
r= 6% 1.17 0.09 0.89 0.06
r = 10% 1.35 0.10 1.09 0.07
RC Logit I - Mileage only
r = 0% 0.79 0.03 0.53 0.02
r= 3% 0.90 0.03 0.64 0.02
r= 6% 1.01 0.04 0.77 0.02
r = 10% 1.17 0.04 0.95 0.03
RC Logit II
r = 0% 0.94 0.19 0.62 0.13
r= 3% 1.07 0.21 0.76 0.15
r= 6% 1.20 0.24 0.91 0.18
r = 10% 1.39 0.28 1.12 0.22
RC Logit III on fuel type
r = 0% 0.82 0.14 0.55 0.10
r= 3% 0.93 0.16 0.67 0.12
r= 6% 1.05 0.18 0.80 0.14
r = 10% 1.21 0.21 0.98 0.17
RC Logit IV - Add noise on fuel cost
r = 0% 1.03 0.05 0.69 0.04
r= 3% 1.17 0.06 0.84 0.04
r= 6% 1.32 0.07 1.00 0.05
r = 10% 1.52 0.08 1.23 0.06
The table reports implied attention weights  for di¤erent estimates and varying assumptions for the
interest rate r and vehicle lifetime S.
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Table B.5: Parameter Estimates Country by Country
Belgium France Germany Great Britain
Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error Estimate St.Error
Mean valuations
Price/Inc. -6.62 0.53 -4.47 0.56 -6.13 0.75 -4.00 0.31
Fuel Costs/Inc. -23.2 3.53 -43.49 2.94 -86.74 3.20 -26.53 2.41
Power (kW/100) 2.95 0.36 2.70 0.41 4.01 0.54 1.19 0.17
Size (cm2/10,000) 8.55 0.69 6.66 0.83 1.37 0.09 0.79 0.08
Height (cm/100) 2.37 0.71 3.49 0.66 3.72 0.69 2.08 0.62
Italy Netherlands Spain
Price/Inc. -9.43 0.80 -6.8 0.41 -2.19 0.30
Fuel Costs/Inc. -51.06 3.75 -44.24 3.77 -56.16 2.84
Power (kW/100) 6.77 0.62 3.84 0.31 1.47 0.29
Size (cm2/10,000) 2.22 0.13 1.66 0.10 2.92 0.95
Height (cm/100) 39.2 0.91 4.19 0.70 9.09 0.78
The table reports the results from estimating logit models per country, parallel to the logit model for all
countries reported in Table 3.
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Table B.6: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Market Shares by Fuel Con-
sumption Quartile
 = 0:50  = 0:91  = 1:00
Change in Market Share Current % Point e p % Point e p % Point e p
Fuel Tax
Tax per liter e0.50 e0.50 e0.50
Fuel Consumption Q1 (lowest) 37 1.4 0 2.1 0 2.4 0
Fuel Consumption Q2 37 -0.2 0 -0.4 0 -0.5 0
Fuel Consumption Q3 20 -0.6 0 -0.9 0 -1.1 0
Fuel Consumption Q4 (highest) 6 -0.6 0 -0.7 0 -0.8 0
Revenue Equivalent Product Tax
Tax per liter/100km e834 e700 e663
Fuel Consumption Q1 (lowest) 37 3.6 0 3.1 0 2.9 0
Fuel Consumption Q2 37 -0.3 0 -0.4 0 -0.5 0
Fuel Consumption Q3 20 -1.6 0 -1.4 0 -1.4 0
Fuel Consumption Q4 (highest) 6 -1.7 0 -1.2 0 -1.1 0
The table reports the same results as in Table 4 for full pass through (we do not let rms change prices
in response to the tax).
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Table B.7: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax and a Product Tax on Fuel Consumption and Fuel
Usage ( = 0:5)
Outside Good Fuel Consumption Fuel Usage
% Point Change % Change % Change
Logit
Fuel Tax 7.19 -1.45 -12.01
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 18.71 -3.37 -30.33
RC Logit I - Mileage Only
Fuel Tax 10.89 -0.77 -29.07
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 17.74 -3.17 -36.08
RC Logit II
Fuel Tax 4.12 -0.77 -12.01
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 7.09 -2.08 -15.21
RC Logit III - Extra RC on fuel cost
Fuel Tax 3.98 -0.79 -10.43
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 8.00 -1.86 -15.65
RC Logit IV - Extra heterog. in fuel cost
Fuel Tax 3.05 -0.99 -6.11
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 6.29 -2.18 -11.39
RC Logit V - Lifetime varies with miles
Fuel Tax 3.45 -0.74 -7.70
Revenue Eq. Product Tax 7.18 -1.61 -13.26
The table reports the e¤ect of a fuel tax and a revenue-equivalent product tax on the share of the
outside good, average fuel consumption, and total annual fuel usage. The simulations are based on the
parameter estimates in Table 3 and Table B.3. In each model we set  = 0:5, so there is no variation in
undervaluation across the di¤erent models. The gures refer to Germany in 2011.
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Table B.8: The E¤ect of a Fuel Tax on Gasoline and Diesel Separately
Fuel Usage Diesel Share
All cars Gasoline cars Diesel cars
% Change % Change % Change % Point Change
Fuel Tax, Gasoline only -9.9 -33.2 17.1 10.0
Fuel Tax, Diesel only -3.5 17.5 -27.8 -8.0
Fuel Tax, both Gas. and Diesel -15.9 -20.7 -10.3 2.4
The table reports the e¤ect of a discriminatory fuel tax for gasoline and diesel cars on total fuel usage
as in Table 6 but simulations are based on the parameter estimates of RC Logit III in Table B.3. The
gures refer to Germany in 2011.
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Table B.9: Explaining the Diesel Market Shares Across Countries
Current Situation Change in Diesel Share: Equalization of
Fuel price gap Fuel Cons. Gap Diesel Share Fuel Price Fuel Cons. Both
Year 1998
Belgium -0.25 -1.91 52% -7% -7% -14%
France -0.26 -2.04 38% -8% -7% -14%
Germany -0.22 -2.35 15% -3% -4% -7%
Great Britain 0.00 -2.24 15% 0% -4% -4%
Italy -0.19 -2.08 21% -4% -5% -9%
Netherlands -0.29 -2.12 21% -6% -5% -10%
Spain -0.11 -1.85 51% -5% -8% -14%
Year 2011
Belgium -0.24 -2.01 75% -2% -7% -9%
France -0.19 -1.81 69% -2% -8% -10%
Germany -0.16 -2.23 46% -3% -10% -12%
Great Britain 0.04 -2.04 50% 1% -9% -8%
Italy -0.13 -2.05 56% -2% -10% -12%
Netherlands -0.28 -2.22 30% -3% -7% -10%
Spain -0.07 -2.08 69% -1% -9% -11%
The table reports: (i) in the rst three columns, the currently observed gaps in fuel prices and fuel
consumption between gasoline and diesel cars, and the diesel market shares in the seven countries of our
dataset in 1998 (upper panel) and 2011 (lower panel); in the last three columns, how the diesel market
share would change if the fuel price gap and fuel consumption gap were eliminated. The simulations are
based on the parameter estimates of RC Logit III in Table B.3.
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